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Pragmatics and Translation: 
the Problem of Presupposition 
James F. Ehrman 
Introduction 
This study addresses the pragmatic dimension in the process of 
translation. Although there is no one undisputed definition of 
pragmatics, the term will be understood in its broadest sense as 
the relationship between language structure and extra-linguistic 
context (Levinson, p. 9). In this relationship, presupposition 
functions to specify the meaning of a linguistic expression by 
appealing to the context in which it is embedded. By specifying 
a level of meaning that is context-dependent, pragmatics 
concentrates on how linguistic expressions are encoded by their 
context (Levinson, p. 8). Within this domain there are a number 
of ways to investigate pragmatic relationships such as speech act 
theory, conversational implicative, deixis, and presupposition. 
However, within the framework of this investigation, the specific 
focus is the problem of presupposition and its consequences for 
both the production and reception of a translation. 
Presupposition refers to those pragmatic inferences or 
assumptions which seem to be built into linguistic expressions 
and can be isolated by linguistic texts (Levinson, p. 68). Accor-
ding to this definition, presupposition relates linguistic structure 
to extra-linguistic context in terms of the inferences which can be 
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made about this context from the linguistic structure itself. As a 
relationship between linguistic expression and extra-linguistic 
context, presupposition differs from logical entailment, which 
refers to those inferences which can be made strictly from the 
linguistic expression itself and are restricted to the truth-
conditions of the expression. In the sentence 
Fred regrets not having received a university fellowship, 
the only truth-conditional inference which can be made is that 
Fred did not receive a university fellowship. However, the verb 
"regret" indicates that Fred wanted a university fellowship; 
otherwise, the verb would be inappropriate. Since he regrets not 
having received a university fellowship, it can be presupposed 
that he wanted it. That Fred wanted a university fellowship is 
not equivalent to Fred's not having received a university 
fellowship and this is the distinction between logical-entailment 
and presupposition. 
The Relationship between Presupposition and Translation 
Because of this capacity to relate contextual information to 
linguistic structure, presupposition is particularly useful for the 
study of translation. In its most fundamental sense, translation is 
concerned with capturing the meaningful components in an 
original text in order to reconstruct them in a text of the target 
language (De Vasconcellos, p. 1). Although the concept of 
constructing a translated text on the basis of meaningful 
equivalence to the original seems almost truistic, its application 
in practice becomes problematic. The main problematic area is 
the notion of "meaningful equivalence," which has given rise to 
numerous debates among translation theorists. Central to this 
debate is whether the notion of meaningful equivalence should 
be expanded from formal semantics to include contextual factors 
of the communicative situation in which translations are made. 
The debate on this notion of meaningful equivalence has 
resulted in a major shift in the focus of translation studies. 
Characteristic of this revision is the movement from prescriptive 
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to descriptive approaches to translation (Hermans, p. 13). The 
main difference between these two approaches is one of 
orientation. A prescriptive approach proceeds from notions of 
how a translation should be made to the construction of a 
translation itself, with the result that theory precedes translation. 
In a descriptive approach the investigation begins with how a 
translation has been made; a theory is then constructed on the 
basis of this investigation. The more recent approaches in the 
field of translation have been descriptive because they focus 
upon the actual practice of translation within a specific historical 
context (Lambert and Van Gorp, p. 42). 
The impetus for this change in orientation has been the 
emphasis on context-dependent rather than context-independent 
meaning in a text. A descriptive approach will first establish a 
framework to capture context-dependent meaning, whereas a 
prescriptive approach will first attempt to isolate a 
reader/translator-independent dimension of meaning in a text. 
This objective dimension will then be used as a basis for 
establishing equivalences by which the translation will be 
constructed. Such a basis is usually developed in terms of formal 
semantics because this linguistic level considers context-invariant 
meaning. A prescriptive approach presumes objectivity as the 
legitimacy criterion and its goal is to preclude any subjective, 
mediating influences of the translator. 
Unfortunately, designating formal semantics as the single 
criterion on which a translation is to be evaluated is arbitrary and 
based on unproven theories which bifurcate language into an 
abstract mental component and a tangible phonological 
component (Wilss, p. 80). Moreover, focusing strictly on notions 
of formal semantics ignores points at which source text and 
translation deviate in terms of their information content. Rather 
than dismissing changes in information as subjective and non-
essential for translation, such deviation becomes the point of 
departure for descriptive approaches to translation. In comparing 
an original text with its translation, how and why these differ 
becomes the object of investigation. Concentrating on this domain 
precludes prescriptive notions of correctness and incorrectness 
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and frees the translation theorist from restrictions on the range 
of what is to be investigated in translation. The goal of the 
descriptive approach is to determine the relevant factors in the 
process of translation and to explain how they function to govern 
both the production and reception of a translation. A focus on the 
translation of presuppositions is consistent with this objective 
because they indicate relationships between text and context. 
Goal and Method of Investigation 
Because it is constituted by a relationship between text and 
context, presupposition is a powerful means to investigate 
contextual factors impacting upon the process of translation. This 
investigation will use presupposition to measure the 
epistemological context and its influence on the translation 
process. Accordingly, this investigation will focus on the 
structures of knowledge in both the original text and its 
translation. To investigate these structures of knowledge, 
presupposition will be used to determine what ideas constitute 
the conceptual framework informing the composition of a text. In 
an epistemological context this framework can best be 
understood in the sense of paradigm, as the term is used by 
historians of science. The term paradigm was coined by Thomas 
Kuhn to show 
how, at a given period, thinking about a particular subject 
is commonly conditioned by some more or less coherent 
system of ideas which act, not so much as explicit tenets of 
a scientific theory, but as unspoken assumptions about the 
range of possible hypotheses which the scientist may 
entertain (Sampson, p. 15). 
Because a paradigm is implicit rather than explicit, it can be 
understood as a set of assumptions which have been 
incorporated into an abstract model both to explain observable 
phenomena and govern what is possible and impossible with 
respect to these phenomena. 
As an abstract model, the concept of paradigm derives 
from an over-arching perspective by which a culture understands 
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itself and its environment. This perspective is influenced 
particularly by social and intellectual developments and can be 
expected to change along with these developments. Since 
presupposition is a way to infer the composition of this 
framework, changes in presupposition indicate changes in the 
conceptual frameworks which contextualize both original text 
and translation. Such changes are not necessarily arbitrary, nor 
do they necessarily reflect that the translator simply erred in 
translation. These changes in presupposition rather indicate 
changes in the way the information of the original text is 
understood in the context of the translation. If certain 
background concepts which contextualize the original text are no 
longer operative in the historical context of the translation, they 
might well be deleted. Moreover, the conceptual framework 
informing the process of translation might well be constituted by 
new ideas, with the result that new presuppositions may be 
introduced into the translation. Because of this link between 
presupposition and conceptual assumptions, changes in 
presupposition can point to variation in the conceptual 
frameworks of the original and the translation. 
The goal of this comparison is to use presupposition to 
proceed inductively from linguistic expressions in the text to 
conceptual structures outside of the text. By relating text and 
context, presupposition provides a junction between conceptual 
structures inside the text and conceptual structures in its 
historical context. For this reason changes in presupposition 
between the original text and the translation do not necessarily 
indicate error in translation but rather a shift in understanding. 
Moreover, this shift in understanding can be specified in the 
changes in the respective historical contexts. 
In this way, the actual comparison is between historical 
contexts and their respective conceptual frameworks. Where no 
change has been introduced into this framework an 
understanding of the original can be expected to be maintained 
in the translation. However, developments in the historical 
distance between the composition of the original and the 
translation will lead to changes between their respective 
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conceptual frameworks. Consequently, changes in understanding 
can be expected at those points where these conceptual 
frameworks deviate significantly. Furthermore, such changes will 
be indicated by the deletion or addition of presuppositions in the 
texts. 
To concentrate specifically on the conceptual dimension, 
the two texts which will be compared are scientific rather than 
literary. The selection of scientific texts is preferable because 
these texts have generally been thought to be free from the 
rhetorical considerations of literary texts. Literary works, 
tradition holds, are particularly characterized by their subjectivity 
and require at least a certain amount of interpretation. Because 
of this interpretation, a translation can be expected to diverge 
from the original1 in at least some respects. A scientific text, on 
the other hand, has been generally understood to be "factual" 
rather than fictitious and for this reason is not considered subject 
to the same interpretive requirements as a literary text. 
By precluding the need for interpretation, translation of 
scientific information has been assumed to involve formal 
semantic equivalence, because, as fact, the meaning of the 
information is invariant. This investigation will refute this 
assumption because it will show that factual texts are also subject 
to interpretive requirements, although these might be different 
from literary interpretive requirements. Interpretation of a 
scientific work lies in the understanding of the concepts which 
have informed the work. Using presupposition to compare the 
conceptual frameworks of an original text and its translation will 
show that, where certain concepts qua facts are not understood, 
the information content of the translation is significantly altered. 
1. The issue of divergence of course begs the issue of some benchmark 
by which it can be measured, particularly in the case of an 
interpretive work. However, establishing the basis for normative 
readings by which to measure deviation is a hermeneutic task beyond 
the scope of this study. 
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The Texts and Their Contexts 
The original text which will be investigated was written by 
Theophrastus von Honenheim or, as he is often known, 
Paracelsus (1493-1541). The text is the second tract from his work 
entitled Liber de nymphis, sylphis, pygmaies et salamandris et de 
caeteris spiritibus [Book of nymphs, sylphs, pygmies, salamanders 
and related spirits]. This work is useful for an investigation into 
the epistemological dimension of translation because it presents 
an excellent example of Paracelsus' way of thinking (Blaser, p. 6). 
The translation is by Manly Palmer Hall and was first printed in 
1964. As this date indicates, Hall's thinking was informed by the 
conceptual framework of the post-eighteenth century. To 
understand the consequences of the historical distance between 
the composition of the original and of the translation, it is 
necessary first to summarize the key points of the conceptual 
frameworks operative in each of these periods. 
In the conceptual framework of the early sixteenth 
century, the primary governing concept is the notion of the 
organic universe. Assumptions about this organic universe were 
not based on inferences made from empirical investigations, but 
rather on the speculations of natural philosophers dating back to 
antiquity. Perhaps the most significant of these concepts is that 
all manifestations of the material universe constitute a 
multiplicity deriving from an underlying unity. This underlying 
unity is called the Prima materia from which matter is created. 
Prima materia as the unified substance underlying all substances 
is not matter strictly speaking, but rather a potentiality which is 
actualized by taking on form. 
Consequent to the union of prima materia and form, 
matter is manifested at its most basic level as an element. As the 
primary level of manifestation, an element can be understood as 
that which makes prima materia concrete. There are four elements: 
1) earth, which has the two properties of being cold and dry; 2) 
water, which as the two properties of being cold and wet; 3) air, 
which has the two properties of being hot and wet; 4) fire, which 
has the two properties of being hot and dry. Although elements 
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are not considered to be capable of further division, they are 
regarded as transmutable. By virtue of the property two elements 
share, the one may be transmuted into the other. For this reason, 
earth, having the properties of cold and dry, may be transmuted 
into water, having the properties of cold and wet, through the 
shared property of coldness. 
A significant consequence of this way of thinking is the 
division of the universe into microcosm and macrocosm. Man is 
conceived as constituted in some measure by each of the four 
elements and for this reason contains all levels of being within 
himself (Conger, ch. xiii). Moreover, the macrocosm and 
microcosm are linked together by a series of sympathies or 
correspondences. Through these analogical relationships all 
existing parts of the universe, seen and unseen, are related. For 
this reason the analogical correspondences found in nature are 
not regarded as descriptive comparisons but rather as essential 
relationships. Consequently, outward resemblance is a sign of 
inward ontological connection (Bosky, p. 61). 
Against this paradigm of the organic universe, a 
competing paradigm developed out of the scientific revolution of 
the seventeenth century. This paradigm was derived from 
empirical approaches to science and is based on the notion of a 
mechanistic universe governed by laws. Being governed by 
natural laws, the phenomena of nature are placed into a 
framework in which they can inevitably be explained by 
empirical experiment. The primary criteria by which an 
experiment is judged valid is that it be repeatable, verifiable, and 
subject to prediction. In this way, the workings of nature are 
limited to explanations in terms of linear causality. Consequently, 
... all the phenomena could be described by simple, 
deterministic laws of force and motion so that all future 
states of the world could in principle be inferred from a 
complete knowledge of its present state... (Sampson, p. 15) 
There was an intentional attempt on the part of the empiricists to 
systematically disprove the conceptual assumptions on which 
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earlier notions of the universe were based. As a result of this 
attempts, empirically derived models gained ascendancy in 
Europe around the beginning of the seventeenth century.2 
Consequently, the Hall translation of Paracelsus' text was made 
in a historical context governed by a conceptual framework 
entirely different from that of the original. 
Analysis 
In the following analysis Hall's translation will be segmented into 
the paragraphs by which he organized his text. Following each 
of Hall's paragraphs will be the corresponding paragraph (or 
paragraphs) from Paracelsus' text. The presuppositions in the 
texts will then be extracted and placed into their respective 
conceptual frameworks. In this way, comparison will actually be 
performed on the level of context to determine where concepts 
have been retained, deleted, or added between the original and 
the translation. 
Hall titles this chapter of his translation Their Habitation 
and Government and the first paragraph begins: 
The habitations of the elementals vary according to the 
element in which they exist; that is, air, fire, water, or earth. 
The people of the water are called nymphs; those of the air, 
sylphs; of the earth, pygmies; and of the fire, salamanders. 
But more correctly the water elementals should be called 
undines; the air people sylvestres; those of the earth and 
mountains, gnomes; and the people of the fire, vulcani 
rather than salamanders (Hall, p. 70). 
The title of Paracelsus' second tract is Von jher Wohnung and 
begins: 
2. The turn towards empirically based models did not happen at a 
constant rate but, for example, occurred earlier in England and 
somewhat later in Germany. 
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Jhr Wohnung sind viererley / das ist / nach den Vier 
Elemente / Einesser / Eine im Lufft / Ein in der Erden / 
Eine im Fewr, Die im Wasser sind Nymphen / die im Lufft 
sind Sylphen / die in der Erden sind Pygmaei / die im Fewr 
Salamandrae. Nun aber / daz sie recht Namen haben / das 
ist nicht sondern solch Nammen so ich do furhalt / 
dieselbigen Nammen sind geben worden von denen / die 
sie nicht erkennt haben. Dieweil sie aber die ding bedeutten 
/vnd durch die Nammen mögen verstanden werden / so 
laß ichs dobey auch bleiben. Wiewol von Wasserleuten 
Vndina der Nam auch ist / vnnd von den Lufftleuten 
Syluestres / vnnd von den Bergleuten Gnomi unnd vom 
Fewer mehr Vulcani als Salamandri; Jedoch wie dem ist / 
wie es mag verstanden werden mit der vnterscheyed / do 
bleibts bey (Blaser, pp. 16-17). 
Hall's translation of this passage is not constituted by any 
linguistic expressions which are presuppositions. As a result, 
there is no linguistic expression which is structurally embedded 
in the conceptual framework of the context. However, there is 
one linguistic expression in the original passage by Paracelsus 
which presupposes information. The sentence "Dieweil sie aber 
die ding bedeutten / vnd durch die Nammen mögen verstanden 
werden / so laß ichs dobey auch bleiben" presupposes an 
ontological relationship between name and object. This 
ontological relationship is established by the conjunction 
"dieweil," or "because," and is a presupposition because it refers 
to background knowledge in which this kind of ontological 
connection is considered valid. The truth-conditional analysis of 
this sentence is that objects are understood by their names. This 
truth-conditional analysis is derived solely from the linguistic 
expression and does not make any statement about the validity 
of the claim. However, the use of the conjunction "dieweil" refers 
the linguistic expression to an already known, contextual 
framework which assumes the validity of ontological connections 
between words and the objects to which they refer. Otherwise, 
the use of "because" would be inappropriate, for this ontological 
connection would have to be first established itself. Since the 
conjunction "because" is used to frame the clause in which an 
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object is understood by its name, an ontological relationship 
between a thing and its name is presupposed. 
The deletion of this presupposition in the Hall text is 
explainable in terms of the disparity in the historical contexts 
between the two texts. An ontological relationship between a 
word and the object which it names is not a part of the 
conceptual framework in which Hall wrote his translation. 
According to more modern linguistic theories, there is an 
arbitrary relationship between the linguistic sign and its referent. 
Although the relationship between a word and the object to 
which it refers may be necessary in terms of convention 
(Benveniste, p. 45), there is otherwise no unseen or metaphysical 
connection or relationship. 
Such a relationship was, however, permissible in the 
conceptual framework which informed the thinking of 
Paracelsus. The essential connection between a name and the 
object to which this name refers is one consequence following 
from the notion that the universe is constructed out of analogical 
relationships. This essential connection is indeed necessary for 
verbal conception because it provides a theoretical framework for 
the development of names and of language itself. According to 
this way of thinking, an invisible, metaphysical reality gives rise 
to both the object and the name, which are apparently discreet 
only in the physical world. As a result, the name and the 
physical object to which the name refers are both consequences 
of the metaphysical reality which precedes and underlies both of 
them. In this way the notion of a name as descriptive is inverted 
since the description is arrived at precisely because of its 
essential connection to the object. In other words, verbal 
conception is not possible except through this ontological 
relationship. 
Because this notion of ontological relationship between 
name and object is alien to the conceptual framework of a 
nineteenth and twentieth century readership, it is conceivable 
that Hall either did not understand it himself, or did not believe 
that his readership would understand it. Due to the possibility of 
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misunderstanding, he elected to delete the claim in its form as a 
presupposition. He does maintain the information which follows 
the claim, namely, that the elementals should "more correctly" be 
referred to by other names. However, there is no rationale for 
why one set of names is more correct than any other, and as a 
result the status of more correctly naming the elementals changes 
from a presupposition to an assertion. 
The next paragraph in the Hall text begins to describe the 
relationships of the elementals to humanity and to each other. 
The paragraph reads: 
Each race of elementals remains confined to its own 
element. The water people have no dealings with the ones 
of the earth; nor the fire people with those of the air. Each 
race lives by itself and never associates with the other 
elementals. Only to man are they drawn, appear to him at 
times, and serve him so that he may recognize God in his 
wonderful creation and learn how all elements are peopled 
and ruled by divine law. The elementals existing in each of 
the four elements differ from one another in person, 
character, species, and habitation, yet they all resemble man 
(Hall, p. 70). 
The Paracelsus text does not make a paragraph break 
here but continues directly from the preceding passage: 
Nun aber so wissen / so jhr Regiones beschrieben sollen 
werden / so müssen sie auch getheylt werden inn jhr Theyl: 
Dann die Wasserleuth haben kein geschefft mit den 
Bergleuthen / die Bergleuth auch nicht mit jhnen / also die 
Syluestres / vnd also auch die Salamander: Jedliches hatt 
sein besonder Wohnung / aber dem Menschen dem 
erscheinen sie wie obsteht / das er erkenn vnnd sech / wie 
wunderbarlich GOTT sey inn seinen Wercken / das er kein 
Element feyern leßt / vnnd leer leßt / er hab doch grosse 
Wunderwecken inn jhnen. Also auff solches folgen hernach 
Vier Regiones / vnnd der Wohnung / auch inn der Person 
/ Wesen / vnnd Artt / wie weit sie sich von einander 
scheyden / vnnd doch dem Menschen gleichförmiger / 
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dann sie selbst einander / vnnd doch all Menschen / wie 
im Ersten Tractat begriffen ist (Blaser, p. 17). 
Comparing these two passages reveals that there is a 
presupposition in the Paracelsus text which has been deleted in 
the Hall text. This presupposition is indicated by the word 
"dann," which means "because" or "for." In the context of the 
passage itself the word "because" conjoins a clause which 
explains the rationale for dividing the elementals into their parts. 
An English paraphrase of the passage reads: 
Know that, just as their locations should be described, so 
must they be divided into their parts. For the people of the 
water have no dealings with the people of the mountains, 
nor the mountain people with them. The same is true for 
the Sylvestres and the Salamanders. 
The presupposition here is the reason why the respective 
elementals do not interact with one another; otherwise, 
introducing the clause with the conjunction "because" or "for" 
would be illogical because it would provide no causal basis for 
dividing the elementals into their respective categories as it does. 
This presupposition governing the division of the 
elementals is the relationship among the elements themselves. 
These constitute the first level of manifestation following the 
union of spirit and matter and are not capable of further 
subdivision. As such they are the foundations upon which 
further manifestations are constructed. Because they are not 
capable of further division, they do not themselves mix together. 
Consequently, the elementals which dwell in each of the four 
elements also cannot mix with each other because to mix would 
be to violate their status as elementals. Hall does not keep the 
passage stating that the elementals must be divided into their 
parts. Rather, he deletes this information and restates the 
rationale for this division in the form of an assertion: "Each race 
of elementals remains confined to its own element." By deleting 
the requirement to divide the elementals into their categories, he 
effectively deletes the presupposition concerning the relationships 
obtaining between the four primary elements. These relationships 
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were an integral part of the conceptual framework of Paracelsus' 
time, but they have not been a part of the conceptual framework 
since the eighteenth century. Consequently, it can again be 
inferred that either Hall did not understand the presupposition 
or believed it would confuse his readership. Due to the potential 
for confusion, this deletion of a presupposition and the 
restatement of information which logically follows from it can be 
ascribed to the change in historical context. 
The final passage from the Hall text reads: 
We recognize the four elements and know that the man 
from Adam can exist and live only in air, which surrounds 
him as water surrounds the fish. Each elemental is created 
for its proper element. To the nymphs, the water is what air 
is to man. And as man wonders how the nymphs can live 
in the water, so do they wonder that man can live in the air 
(Hall, p. 70). 
The corresponding passage from Paracelsus reads: 
Nun wie jhr wissen / dass Vier Element seind / der Lufft 
/ Wasser / Erden vnnd Fewr: Nun wissen jhr / daß wir 
Menschen auß Adam im Lufft stehnd und gehnd / und 
seind mit jhm vmbgeben / wie ein Visch mit seim Wasser 
Vnd als wenig mögen wir ohn denselbigen sein / als ein 
Visch ohn Wasser. Nun wie der Visch im Wasser sein 
Wohnung hatt / vnd das Wasser ist an dem ortt sein Lufft 
dorinn er wohnt: Also ist dem Menschen der Lufft in sein 
Elementen beschaffen / dorinn zuwandern. Nach dem 
Exempel verstanden die Vndenen / daß sie im Wasser 
wohnen / vnnd das Wasser ist jhnen gleich geben als vns 
der Lufft; vnd wie wir vns verwundern / daß sie im Wasser 
sollen sein / so verwundern sie ob vns / im Lufft zu sein 
(Blaser, p. 17). 
There is one presupposition in the Hall text with a 
corresponding presupposition in the Paracelsus text. This 
presupposition is set off by the factive verb "know" and reads: 
"know that the man from Adam can exist and live only in air..." 
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The corresponding presupposition in the Paracelsus text is also 
set off by the factive verb "know" and reads: "Nun wissen jhr / 
daß wir Menschen auß Adam im Lufft stehnd und gehnd..." In 
both instances, the presupposition is that man exists/lives in the 
air. One reason why this presupposition has been retained in the 
translation is that it does not involve an overt change in 
conceptual framework. That human beings exist, as it were, in 
the air, as opposed to the water, is not really a problem of 
conception. TTie conlusions which a sixteenth century reader vis 
à vis a seventeenth century reader might draw may indeed have 
been different, but the presupposition as such is not a problem 
for translation. 
The translation problem results from the information 
conveyed by an additional presupposition of the Paracelsus text 
such that is again undergoes a change in status from 
presupposition to assertion. This presupposition is also indicated 
by the factive verb "know" and reads in the context of the 
passage: "Nun wie jhr wissen / dass Vier Element seind / der 
Lufft / Wasser / Erden / vnnd Fewr." Through the use of a 
factive verb the reader is referred back to the presupposition that 
there are four elements which are air, water, earth and fire. Hall's 
translation of this line reads: "We recognize the four elements..." 
and makes no factive reference at all. If the passage has stated 
that "we recognize that there are four elements," then the verb 
"recognize" would have been used in the factive sense. However, 
as used in this context "recognize" is similar to "posit" and could 
be rephrased: "we posit the four elements." In this sense 
"recognize" is used to introduce something new, ergo the 
necessity for recognition, and has the status of an assertion. 
It may be argued that the act of recognition requires an 
object to be recognized and for this reason presupposes the object 
of recognition. In this way, "recognize" would in fact be used in 
the sense of "recognize that." However, if that were the case, the 
question arises as to why the verb was not used in an overtly 
factive sense because there is no syntactic necessity preventing 
this usage. In fact, using the verb in this way by stating 
"recognize that" would be syntactically closer to the original text. 
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Moreover, it cannot be unequivocally specified that the verb 
should be understood in this sense, because it is just as easily 
interpreted as an assertion. For this reason, arguments supporting 
a factive use of "recognize" are weakened. 
Because the use of the verb "recognize" is assertive rather 
than factive, a strong case can be made for the statement that, in 
this instance, a change in conceptual framework resulting from 
historical distance has again informed the construction of the 
translation. As previously discussed, the concept of the four 
primary elements belongs to a pre-empirical conceptual 
framework. Since it is embedded in this older thinking, this 
concept is unsuited as a presupposition in an empirically 
oriented conceptual framework. Owing to this unsuitability, it 
can be expected that this concept would be introduced in the 
form of an assertion for a modern readership. Presenting this 
concept as a presupposition would have been confusing to a 
readership not familiar with the general pre-empirical conceptual 
framework and might have affected the reception of the 
translation. 
Conclusion 
Each of these three examples demonstrates a pattern in which 
certain information conveyed in the original text by means of 
presupposition undergoes a change to the status of assertion in 
the translation. This change in status is brought about by deleting 
the presupposition and then restating the information consequent 
to the presupposition in the form of an assertion. There is no 
grammatical or syntactic necessity whatsoever for this change in 
status. Hall could just as well have constructed his translation on 
the basis of some formal equivalence in which the 
presuppositional structure is maintained. 
The significance of his deletion of presupposition can be 
assessed in two ways: arbitrary or intentional. If the deletion of 
presupposition is arbitrary, no valid inferences about the process 
of translation can be drawn. However, the consistent pattern 
which becomes evident in the Hall translation strongly suggests 
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that the deletion of presupposition is not arbitrary. Each deletion 
of presupposition in the translation occurs specifically at that 
point at which the presupposed information is embebbed in the 
conceptual framework of the sixteenth century. Consequently, 
presuppositions are deleted where the presupposed information 
is inconsistent with the conceptual framework of the post-
eighteenth century. 
The regularity of this parallel between the deletion of 
presupposition and the change of conceptual framework strongly 
suggests a causal connection between understanding and the 
decision to delete certain presuppositions. The term 
"understanding" is used here in the general sense of mental 
comprehension and refers to the apprehension of general 
relations of particulars (Woolf, p. 1267). As a result the decision 
to delete presuppositions embedded in the context of a sixteenth 
century conceptual framework is governed by a change in 
understanding which derives from the change to a post-
eighteenth century conceptual framework. To avoid confusion or 
misunderstanding that might arise from this inconsistency, Hall 
intentionally opted to delete these presuppositions. Changes in 
information between original and translation are not arbitrary but 
follow from a change in understanding on the part of the 
translator, who is translating in a new historical context and 
consequently within a new conceptual framework. 
Showing the consequences of changes in understanding 
on the translation of a factual text raises a number of 
hermeneutic issues. The first concerns the ability of the linguistic 
element itself to convey signification which has its locus in the 
context, rather than the text itself. Using presuppositions to infer 
components of what can be called a conceptual framework, the 
comparison of presuppositions between an original text and its 
translation is tantamount to a comparison of the conceptual 
frameworks in which each text is embedded. By making a 
comparison on this level, changes in conceptual framework can 
be expected to result in changes of information between original 
and translation as measured by the use or absence of 
presupposition. 
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Since concepts change over time, it seems that factual 
discourse is to a large extent subject to interpretive requirements 
similar in principle to those of fictional discourse. Even though 
there is no grammatical or syntactic necessity preventing a more 
"literal translation," a "conceptual necessity" seems to have 
governed the construction of the translation. This conceptual 
necessity arises because the conceptual structure which informs 
certain linguistic expressions of the original text are simply not 
present in the context of the translation. Due to these gaps in 
conceptual structure a new or different understanding is brought 
to bear on the information of the text. In this way some 
information will be misunderstood or not understood at all. As 
a result the translator is faced with the problem of dealing with 
the new understanding a new readership will bring to the 
translation. 
How the translator deals with this problem raises the 
issue of the naive and informed translator. A naive translator is 
one who does not know to account for shifts in understanding 
resulting from changes in conceptual framework. The naive 
translator can therefore be expected to introduce changes into the 
translation vis-à-vis the original because these changes may not 
be grasped as such. In this way, any hermeneutic process of re-
contextualization is circumvented, or rather omitted. 
Consequently, information in the original which is not 
understood by the translator is either deleted or changed to fit 
the norms of contemporary understanding. For this reason, a 
naive translation introduces the original into a new context but 
strips it of its own context. 
An informed translator, on the other hand, could be 
expected to re-contextualize the translation by attempting to 
compensate for changes in conceptual framework between 
original and new contexts. One way to do this might be to "gloss" 
the translation by overtly including presupposed information 
along with the translation itself. Such information could be 
included either in the body of the translation or in footnotes. In 
this way the reader can make up for deficiencies in contextual 
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information and thus obtain a better understanding of the 
translation. By adding otherwise presupposed information, an 
informed translation introduces an original text into a new 
context with some attempt to keep the original context intact. 
One could argue that Hall did not do his "hermeneutic 
homework" because he does not seem to have made any attempt 
to recontextualize those concepts with which a nineteenth century 
reader would be unfamiliar. Since such re-contextualization is 
lacking, it might be concluded that Hall is a naive translator. 
However, this conclusion is actually premature because it cannot 
be determined whether Hall himself was unfamiliar with the 
conceptual framework of the sixteenth century and hence did not 
fully understand the presuppositions of the text, or whether he 
determined that this framework would be confusing for his 
readership. If the latter is the case, he may have intentionally 
constructed his translation with the objective of making it as 
accessible as possible to a post-eighteenth century readership by 
eliminating potential points of confusion. By making his 
translation as accessible as possible to a new readership, Hall 
introduces the Paracelsus text outside of its sixteenth century 
conceptual framework. 
Evaluating Hall's strategy involves the issue of 
determining what is to be evaluated and a standard by which 
this can be measured. Any evaluation in terms of 
correct/incorrect is necessarily based on prescriptive notions 
which are themselves embedded in a particular context. If, for 
example, the standard is one of equivalence to the original text, 
then Hall's translation obviously falls short of the mark. 
However, there is no reason to make equivalence the basis for 
evaluation because equivalence in terms of formal semantics and 
syntax would involve introducing presuppositions predicated 
upon a conceptual framework unfamiliar to a post-eighteenth 
century readership. To avoid potential confusion that could result 
from this unfamiliarity, Hall opted to delete the presuppositions 
and subsequently to assert the information which follows from 
these presuppositions. This strategy makes sense from the 
standpoint of the reception of the translation and is itself 
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revealing about the standards of the practice of translation during 
his time. 
Recognizing that these standards of translation shift with 
changes in historical contexts is the basis for descriptive 
approaches to the study of translation. Functionally, these are 
more appropriate than limited prescriptive approaches because 
comparing differences between a translation and its original 
reveals something about the standards by which translations are 
both produced and received. Moreover, studying how standards 
of translation shift indicates changes in priorities and 
consequently points to developments in the historical context. In 
this endeavor the use of presupposition is particularly useful by 
virtue of its capacity to infer specific elements of context from 
structures in the text itself. In this way, inferences about the 
context are based on heuristic notions of periodization which are 
themselves subject to biases of context. Because of this empirical 
foundation, a pragmatic approach using presupposition 
significantly enhances the field of translation study through its 
use as an effective instrument of investigation. 
University of Texas at Austin 
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